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Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine
By MARCY STRAUSS*
Introduction
When does an individual have the right not to listen to or see an
offensive message? The notion that, in certain circumstances, the unwill-
ingness of persons to receive a message outweighs another's right to
speak has been a part of First Amendment analysis for over fifty years.
For example, in Kovacs v. Cooper,1 a majority of the United States
Supreme Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting the use of sound trucks
that emit loud and raucous noises, expressing concern for the plight of
the unwilling listener who is "practically helpless to escape [the noises]
... except through the protection of the municipality."2 The concept
that the government may regulate speech delivered to an unwilling lis-
tener is usually referred to as the "captive audience doctrine."
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, CA. J.D., Georgetown Univer-
sity Law Center, 1981; B.S., Northwestern University, 1978. I am grateful to Erwin Chemer-
insky for reading and critiquing the multiple drafts of the Article, and for his constant support.
Thanks are also owed to Larry Solum and Daniel Conkle for their thoughtful comments, and
to my research assistant, Paul Hamada for his excellent work on the article. I wish to thank
the participants in workshops held at Loyola Law School and at Indiana University (Bloom-
ington) School of Law for their insightful comments and suggestions.
1. 336 U.S. 77 (1949). One year earlier, in Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948), the
Court struck down an ordinance which required the chief of police to license loudspeakers
prior to their use in public places. Id. at 559-60. The Court held that the regulation was an
unconstitutional prior restraint which gave the police chief great discretion in awarding
licenses without sufficient guidelines. Id. The dissent favored greater control over loudspeak-
ers, arguing that "[s]urely there is not a constitutional right to force unwilling people to lis-
ten." Id. at 563 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Several prominent scholars during this time also
began to champion the cause of the captive audience. See, eg., Charles L. Black, Jr., He
Cannot Choose But Hear: The Plight of the Captive Auditor, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 960 (1953).
Justice Douglas began vehemently asserting the privacy rights of the unwilling listener, both in
his writings off the bench and in his judicial opinions. See, e.g., Public Utilities Comm'n v.
Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 468 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See generally Dorothy Glancy,
Getting Government Off the Backs of People. The Right of Privacy and Freedom of Expression
in the Opinions of Justice William 0. Douglas, 21 SANTA CLARA L. Rnv. 1047 (1981). Protec-
tion for the unwilling listener in certain circumstances, even if it means silencing the speaker, is
now well entrenched in First Amendment jurisprudence. See infra notes 2-4 and accompany-
ing text.
2. Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 87.
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Despite numerous Supreme Court cases invoking this doctrine,3 the
most recent in 1988,1 the precise contours of this theory remain unclear.
Rarely, if ever, is anyone truly captive; there is almost always some alter-
native means the unwilling listener can take to avoid the message. The
unanswered question is: when should the burden be placed on listeners to
turn their heads, avert their eyes, close their ears, or even psychologically
tune out the message, rather than force the speaker to cease communicat-
ing? Courts and commentators have failed to describe consistently and
adequately when an audience is captive.' Instead, the phrase "captive
audience doctrine" has become a buzzword, inserted into the analysis as
though it were self-defining. It has become a slogan without substance.
Perhaps part of the problem in defining the scope of the captive au-
dience doctrine is that the rationale for protecting persons from unwel-
come speech has not been adequately explored. Courts routinely invoke
the talismanic phrase "the right to be let alone," as though these words
explain all.6 Rarely do judges explain what this right means, or why it is
valued. The truth is that government often does not "leave us alone,"
and it is not intuitively clear when it should do so.
The failure to adequately define the philosophic and legal basis for a
captive audience doctrine has real costs. Courts can mold the captive
audience doctrine to curtail free speech inappropriately. As Professor
Laurence Tribe cautioned, "the concept of a 'captive audience' is dan-
gerously encompassing," 7 and thus it is especially important that the the-
ory be precisely defined. Moreover, the captive audience doctrine allows
courts to ignore the traditional requirement of content neutrality; courts
inevitably engage in viewpoint- or content-based discrimination when ap-
3. See, e.g., infra notes 15-24 and 26-39 and accompanying text.
4. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
5. An exceptional and comprehensive discussion of the captive audience doctrine is
found in Franklin S. Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There A Right Not To Be Spoken To? 67
Nw. U. L. REv. 153 (1972). The article, however, does not address the concerns I raise here.
Other articles that at least touch upon the captive audience doctrine include G. Michael Tay-
lor, Comment, "I'll Defend To The Death Your Right To Say It... But Not To Me"--The
Captive Audience Corollary To The First Amendment, 2 S. ILL. U. L.J. 211 (1983); Olivia
Goodkin & Maureen Ann Phillips, The Subconscious Taken Captive: A Social, Ethical And
Legal Analysis of Subliminal Communication Technology, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1077 (1981).
6. The roots of the captive audience doctrine can be traced to a landmark article on
privacy by Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren in 1890. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Bran-
deis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890). The article focuses on the right to
keep certain facts from the public eye. Samuel Warren was outraged at the media coverage of
his wife, a Boston socialite. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. Rnv. 383 (1960).
Warren and Brandeis argue that individuals have the right to be let alone, and that such a right
is essential to the development of an inviolate personality. Beyond this, they do not develop
the idea of the right to be let alone. This cursory analysis, unfortunately, is typical in this area.
7. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAWV 950 n.24 (2d ed. 1988).
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plying the doctrine.8 Any theory that permits courts to silence speech
based on content demands careful consideration.
Finally, the failure to define adequately a captive audience leaves no
way of resolving some difficult First Amendment questions now being
posed. In the last few years, regulating racist, sexist, and other kinds of
hate speech increasingly has come to the forefront of First Amendment
issues.' For many, including myself, this issue poses an almost irrecon-
cilable conflict between a commitment to free expression and a com-
mitment to civil rights. Many civil libertarians have tried to resolve this
dilemma by interposing the captive audience solution: racist,
homophobic, or sexist speech may be spoken, but not to a captive audi-
ence. 10 This, of course, helps relieve troubled consciences: we reaffirm
the value of the First Amendment, but, at least symbolically, recognize
the evils of hate speech by limiting its usage. Yet, it begs the question of
when an audience is captive. Is an African-American captive when the
racist message is delivered in a campus cafeteria? What about the Jewish
man who is followed down the street by an individual shouting anti-Se-
mitic messages? Is the woman whose boss keeps pornographic pictures
in his private office captive if she never sees them, yet knows of their
existence? Current conceptions of the captive audience doctrine at best
merely provide the starting point for analysis.
8. See infra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
9. For merely a sampling of the articles recently written on the topic of regulating racist
speech, see Note, First Amendment-Racist and Sexist Expression on Campus-Court Strikes
Down University Limits on Hate Speech, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1397 (1990); Mari J. Matsuda,
Public Response To Racist Speech. Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320
(1989); Jon Weiner, Reagan's Children: Racial Hatred on Campus, 248 NATION 260 (1989);
Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus,
1990 DUKE L.J. 431. See also infra notes 58-68 and accompanying text.
10. See generally, Steve France, Hate Goes to College, 76 A.B.A. J. 44, 48 (July 1990)
(some have tried to combat racist speech by expanding the concept of, among other things, the
captive audience); Lawrence, supra note 9, at 456 ("[t]he regulation of otherwise protected
speech has been permitted when the speech invades the privacy of the unwilling listener's
home or when the unwilling listener cannot avoid the speech. Racist posters, flyers, and graf-
fiti in dorms, classrooms, bathrooms, and other common living spaces would fall within the
reasoning of these cases"); Matsuda, supra note 9, at 2372 (supporting broader restrictions on
racist speech, notes that "students [on campus] are analogous to the captive audience"). See
also Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1990)
(discussing the captive audience doctrine with respect to sexual harassment in the workplace
and the First Amendment); J.M. Balkin, Some Realism about Pluralism: Legal Realist Ap-
proaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 423 (author, when discussing sexual
harassment in the workplace, noted that "[flew audiences are more captive than the average
worker"); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1535 (N.D. Fla. 1991)
("female workers.., are a captive audience in relation to the speech that comprises the hostile
work environment").
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My objective, then, is to redefine the captive audience doctrine by
exploring its moral and legal underpinnings, and therefore provide sub-
stance to the slogan. More specifically, Part I examines the current case
law and shows how the doctrine is riddled with inconsistency and ambi-
guity. In Part II, the ramifications of this confusion are considered.
Given the costs of the captive audience doctrine, and the need to at least
reformulate--if not abolish-it, Part III analyzes the philosophical and
legal purposes of the captive audience doctrine. Without an understand-
ing of the reasons for protecting a captive audience, no accurate weighing
of the right not to hear against the right to freedom of expression can
occur. Without knowing precisely what rights we are protecting, and
how important these rights are, it is difficult to develop a cogent theory
for the captive audience "exception" to the First Amendment. Ulti-
mately, Part III concludes that both courts and scholars have become
mired in platitudes. Phrases like "the right to privacy" and the "right to
be let alohe," which have intuitive appeal, are mere substitutes for rigor-
ous analysis.
Ambiguity concerning the scope and purpose of a right to be let
alone might be acceptable if one were simply developing a statement of
aspirations. In the best of all worlds, it is a nice idea to have tranquility,
to not be interrupted by others, to decide to whom one speaks and lis-
tens. But courts do not merely contemplate social mores; recognizing the
right to be let alone means curtailing the right to freedom of expression
guaranteed by the First Amendment. Thus, Part III attempts to "fine
tune" the right to be let alone. Three values behind the right not to hear
or see speech are considered: the right to choose what information one
receives, the right to repose, and the right to be free from offense. It is
these specific rights, rather than an amorphous "right to be let alone,"
that must be considered, .evaluated, and weighed against any First
Amendment interests. Part III explores the meaning of these three spe-
cific values, and how they relate to the right not to hear or see certain
messages.
Finally, Part IV suggests a model for the captive audience doctrine
that is consistent with the values discussed in Part III. Here, I propose
to give content to the slogan "captive audience" by suggesting the vari-
ous factors a court should consider when employing that doctrine, and
how the doctrine should be balanced against speech interests.
[Vol. 19:85
I. The Captive Audience Doctrine: Slogan, Not Substance
A. The Conceptual Confusion of the Captive Audience Doctrine
The idea of a "captive" audience inevitably causes confusion. At-
tempting to define captivity raises two interrelated problems. First, the
concept of captivity itself is contradictory. We are always captive in
some senses, and never captive in others. Unless living the existence of a
hermit, we are always exposed to the sights, sounds, and smells of others
in society. On the other hand, we are virtually never captive, because
there is almost always something we can do to avoid exposure to
whatever we find most offensive. We can shut our eyes and plug our
ears; we can pull our shades in our homes. If the Court relies on the
recipient's ability to shut out sights or sounds, "then almost no commu-
nication will be intrusive enough to warrant regulation."'"
The question is, how great a burden should be imposed on the un-
willing listener to avoid the message in order to protect someone's right
to speak? There is a continuum of action, from obviously minimal to
more extremely burdensome conduct, that could be taken to avoid verbal
and nonverbal speech: people can turn their heads, shut their eyes, turn
off their radios, put their hands over their ears, walk away, cross the
street, avoid the place of speech, and so on. What is a reasonable or
unreasonable burden in balancing the person's right to be free from the
message with the speaker's right to convey it? The captive audience doc-
trine turns on this issue; it is central to even defining when someone is
captive. Yet nothing in the metaphor of a captive audience offers any
answer. 12
The second problem is, to what extent is avoiding the message even
a solution? Are the harms of being a captive to speech alleviated if the
11. Goodkin & Phillips, supra note 5, at 1130 n.321. Concededly, there are times when
the most arduous attempts to stay in the home and shut out noise likely would be unsuccessful.
Even industrial-strength ear plugs, for example, might not shut out a boisterous sidewalk dem-
onstration. The question then becomes whether one is obligated to do more, such as leave
one's home, to avoid the speech. See infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
12. Courts generally uphold restrictions when it is impractical for the unwilling viewer or
auditor to avoid exposure, but fail to define what they mean by impractical. See, e.g.,
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975). Professor Haiman has urged an
"impossibility" standard: speech should only be silenced when it is impossible for the recipient
to turn away. Haiman, supra note 5, at 182-84, 194-95. See also Norman W. Provizer, Of
Lines & Men: The Supreme Court, Obscenity and the Issue of the Avertable Eye, 13 TULSA L.J.
52 (1977) (author says line between impossible and impracticable is important but does not
explain why); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., v. McAvey, 450 F. Supp.
1265, 1270 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that public seated in plaza area are not captive because
they are free to move away from undesired communication, yet finding no need for them to do
that-without explanation).
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person is able to turn away after an initial exposure? Or is the initial
exposure by itself an evil that justifies finding a person captive even if
capable of avoiding the message? 13 Moreover, can people be "psychic
captives," that is, incapable of escaping the impact of the speech even if
they never hear or see the actual message? For example, if a woman is
aware that there is a pornographic cartoon about her posted in the men's
bathroom, can the government justify restricting that speech based on
the captive audience doctrine if she never sees it, yet can never forget that
it is there and cannot put it out of her mind?" Or, what about a Jewish
resident of Skokie who knows about a planned Nazi march in Brooklyn,
knows the essentials of the hate-filled message, and finds the idea of Nazi
speech anywhere abhorrent and offensive? Should an avid anti-abortion
activist be able to claim "psychic captivity" to the knowledge that an
abortion clinic provides pro-choice information to patients?
As discussed more fully later, the Supreme Court has held that indi-
viduals may be captive even if they can subsequently turn away from the
speech, because the initial exposure by itself constitutes an assault on
their sensibilities. In such circumstances, courts protect individuals
before any contact with the speech occurs. Once initial exposure to the
speech is no longer an essential element of the captive audience doctrine,
the theory loses some of its limitations. It is then conceivable that speech
would be prohibited even before it is uttered.
Despite numerous Supreme Court decisions invoking the captive au-
dience doctrine, the Court has failed to shed any meaningful light on the
definition of captivity and on the precise burden placed on individuals to
avoid the message. Perhaps the only clear conclusions one can draw is
that the captive audience doctrine is more likely to be used to restrict
speech when the individual is viewed as a "captive in the home" than
simply on the street, 15 and individuals are more likely to be viewed as
captive when the speech is spoken, rather than written.16 Even within
13. See, eg., infra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
14. Of course, there may be other grounds for regulating the speech besides the captive
audience doctrine. Such speech may violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by impermissibly
interfering with the woman's employment opportunity. See Strauss, supra note 10, at 3.
15. See Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 209 n.4 (individual privacy entitled to greater protection in
home than in streets); Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 464 (1952) ("However
complete his right of privacy may be at home, it is substantially limited by the rights of others
when its possessor travels on a public thoroughfare or rides in a public conveyance."); United
States Postal Serv. v. Hustler Magazine, 630 F. Supp. 867, 870 (D.D.C. 1986) (there are
unique privacy interests in the home). See also Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Frisby v. Schultz,
Reconciling Public Political Expression with Residential Privacy Rights, 6 J.L. & POL. 173, 187
(1989); and infra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
16. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978); Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d
1082, 1100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). But see Rowan v. United
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those categories, the Court has not consistently defined what is meant by
captive.
L The Captive Audience at Home
In protecting the individual's privacy in the home, the Court has not
consistently explained when it will impose on the unwilling recipient
some burden, even a minimal one, to turn away from the message, rather
than silence the speaker. At times, the Court has placed some obligation
even on persons within the home to reject the speech. In Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Products Corp.,17 the Court held unconstitutional a statute
that prohibited the mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contracep-
tives to the home. The Court noted that
the First Amendment "does not permit the government to prohibit
speech as intrusive unless the 'captive' audience cannot avoid ob-
jectionable speech." Recipients of objectionable mailings, how-
ever, may "'effectively avoid further bombardment of their
sensibilities simply by averting their eyes.'" Consequently, the
"short, though regular, journey from mail box to trash can... is
an acceptable burden, at least so far as the Constitution is
concerned." 18
Similarly, the Court in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service
Commission 19 refused to find individuals at home captive to mailing in-
serts, lauding nuclear power, placed in the utility company's bills. Those
who did not wish to read the insert could avert their eyes, or "escape
exposure to objectionable material simply by transferring the bill insert
from envelope to wastebasket."20
The government, however, can protect the individual at home when
that person has taken affirmative steps to avoid the unwanted message.
For example, the Court has frequently indicated that the state may stop
speech from reaching those who have assumed the burden of notifying
the speaker, or the distributor of information, that they do not want to
receive the message. In Martin v. Struthers,21 the Court struck down a
States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970) and infra notes 23-24 and accompanying
text. See also Haiman, supra note 5, at 182-83.
17. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
18. Id. at 72 (citations omitted).
19. 447 U.S. 530 (1980). The New York Court of Appeals held that the New York Public
Service Commission could prohibit Consolidated Edison's inserts because the utilities custom-
ers had no choice but to receive the insert and the views expressed there about nuclear power
could inflame their sensibilities. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 390
N.E.2d 749, 755 (N.Y. 1979).
20. Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 542.
21. 319 U.S. 141 (1943). The decision in Martin was somewhat undercut in Breard v.
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951), where the Court upheld as constitutional an order prohibit-
CAPTIVE AUDIENCE DO=TRNE
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complete ban on door-to-door solicitation, noting that the homeowner
"could protect himself from such intrusion by an appropriate sign that he
is unwilling to be disturbed."22 Likewise, in Rowan v. United States Post
Office Department,23 the Court rejected a constitutional challenge to a
postal provision allowing individuals to specify to the Postmaster Gen-
eral certain mailings they do not want to receive.24 In essence, the Court
still requires the homeowner to turn away from the speech; but instead of
personally throwing the mailings in the garbage can, the unwilling recipi-
ent designates an agent to do it for him.
Significantly, in both Martin and Rowan, only unwilling listeners
were cut off from the speech. In many captive audience cases, however,
there are willing audiences who would be deprived of the message if the
speech was stopped.25 Protecting listeners only after they indicate an
unwillingness to hear or see the speech minimizes the intrusion on will-
ing listeners; those who wish to receive the message may continue to do
so with minimal interference. The burden, albeit a minimal one, is
placed on the undesiring recipient to curtail the speech.
At times, however, the Court refuses to impose any requirement
that the recipient turn away from or turn off the message. For example,
in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,26 the Court rejected any suggestion that
the offended listener of the radio broadcast of George Carlin's "Seven
Dirty Words," simply change stations or turn off the radio. The Court
concluded that even fleeting contact with the offensive message is too
great a burden for the home listener: "to say that one may avoid further
offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent language is like
ing door to door commercial solicitation without the prior consent of the homeowner. Breard
therefore, presumptively bars speech until the recipient requests it; Martin and Rowan v.
United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970), allow speech unless the individuals who
desire not to hear take steps to stop it. "The latter [approach], quite obviously, is more defer-
ential to speech than the former." Michael E. Tigar, The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, Fore-
word: Waiver of Constitutional Rights Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARv. L. Rrv. 1, 121 n.23
(1970).
22. 319 U.S. at 148.
23. 397 U.S. 728 (1970). For a discussion of Rowan, see generally, Walter G. Hiltz, Case
Comment, Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) Constitutional
Law-Right of Privacy, 5 SuFFOLK U.L. REv. 302 (1970). See also United States v. Treatman,
408 F. Supp. 944, 954 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (Rowan permits injunction against sexually oriented
mailings only if requested by mailees, not by government).
24. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 728. The decision in Rowan has been criticized as not sufficiently
speech protective: the ability to throw away mail is such a "simple operation that it is difficult
to understand the necessity for any further restrictions." Haiman, supra note 5, at 180.
25. See, eg., infra note 31 and accompanying text.
26. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). Pacifica is one of the most controversial of the content regula-
tion cases. See Daniel A. Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist
View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727, 754 & n.145 (1980).
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saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first
blow."'27 The Court, in a footnote, repeated the maxim that outside the
home, the burden on the listener may be greater.2" This approach begs
the question: why is the radio listener considered captive in the first
place? The Court's position, applied more generally that any exposure is
too much, would eradicate any requirement that the listener turn away.
The Court provides no way to distinguish this brief exposure, which con-
stitutes an assault, from other glimpses of unwanted speech, which pre-
sumably do not constitute assaults.29
This protection for the at-home captive audience in Pacifica is par-
ticularly ironic because the complaining party was a father listening with
his son, not at home, but in the car.30 There was no evidence that anyone
tuned into the station at home was offended. Additionally, unlike Rowan,
Pacifica cuts off the speech not only from the unwilling listener, but from
willing listeners as well. 31 The Court's response-that people can still go
to nightclubs to hear Carlin or buy his records32 -is disingenuous. Lis-
tening to Carlin on the radio is so different in kind from those other
media, both in affordability and ease of access, as to be not comparable.33
Individuals who desire to hear Carlin will need to go to much greater
lengths to do so; many radio listeners likely will not avail themselves of
these other avenues. More important, those who are unfamiliar with
Carlin-and thus would not buy his records or attend his concerts but
might still enjoy listening to him-will not hear his message. Without
the initial radio exposure, the speaker loses the opportunity to cultivate
the willing listener, and individuals miss the chance to decide if they
want further exposure to the message.
The notion in Pacifica that recipients of information in the home
have no responsibility to turn away from an unwanted message was reaf-
27. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49. This holding seems ironic given the Court's statement in
Rowan that unwilling recipients of a radio or television message, unlike the recipient of mail,
may easily escape the message by turning off the receiver. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 737.
28. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749 n.27.
29. See, eg., supra note 20 and accompanying text, and infra notes 46,48 and accompany-
ing text
30. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 730.
31. Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Power, Jr., Televised Violence: First Amendment
Principles and Social Science Theory, 64 VA. L. REv. 1123, 1233 (1978) ("surprising as it may
seem to the majority [of the Court], significant numbers of people exist who are not offended
by Carlin's monologue. The rights of this 'receptive, unoffended majority' are affected drasti-
cally." (citation omitted)).
32. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 760.
33. Krattenmaker & Power, supra note 31, at 1233-34.
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firmed recently in a different context. In Frisby v. Schultz.3 4 the Supreme
Court broadly interpreted the idea of a captive audience within the home
when it upheld a city ordinance against "focused" residential picketing.
The ordinance made it unlawful "'for any person to engage in picketing
before or about the residence or dwelling of an individual in the town of
Brookfield.' , This law was challenged by two individuals who, along
with several others, had picketed in front of a doctor's home, protesting
his performance of abortions. Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court,
upheld the ordinance, finding that the words "residence" or "dwelling"
narrowed the law so that it prohibited only "picketing focused on, and
taking place in front of, a particular residence."36 So construed, the ordi-
nance was consistent with the First Amendment's prohibition on offen-
sive speech when the audience is captive:
The target of the focused picketing banned by the Brookfield ordi-
nance is just such a "captive." The resident is figuratively, and
perhaps literally, trapped within the home, and because of the
unique and subtle impact of such picketing is left with no ready
means of avoiding the unwanted speech.37
Unfortunately, Frisby blurred, rather than clarified, what is meant
by the captive audience, and the decision creates more questions than it
answers. What does it mean to be "figuratively" trapped in the house,
and how is this different from literally? Did the Court mean that the
individual could not leave his home or could not use his home for its
traditional purposes? Although there was evidence introduced in the dis-
trict court that the picketers on one occasion blocked the Victoria farn-
ily's exit from the house,"8 the Supreme Court placed no weight on this
fact when finding the ordinance constitutional. Instead, the Court held
that any resident subjected to "targeted picketing" is, without any fur-
ther factual showing, captive to that speech.39
Moreover, the Court shrugged off, almost cavalierly, the notion that
the recipient of unwanted communication should bear some responsibil-
ity for avoiding the speech. The Court asserted without further discus-
34. 487 U.S. 474 (1988). For a discussion of residential picketing, see, e.g., Edward B.
Arnolds & Michael P. Seng, Picketing and Privacy: Can I Patrol on the Street Where You Live?
1982 S. ILL. U. L.J. 463 (1982); Daniel M. Taubman, Comment, Picketers at the Doorstep, 9
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95 (1974); Alfred Kamin, Residential Picketing and the First
Amendment, 61 Nw. U. L. REv. 177 (1967); Comment, Picketing the Homes of Public Offi-
cials, 34 U. CHi. L. REv. 106 (1966-1967).
35. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 477 (citation omitted).
36. Id. at 482.
37. Id. at 487.
38. Schultz v. Frisby, 619 F. Supp. 792, 795 (E.D. Wis. 1985).
39. Cf. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 494-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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sion that the homeowner had no means of avoiding the speech.4 Indeed,
one lower court case interpreted Frisby as not placing any burden on the
homeowner to avoid the message.4 Yet the Brookfield ordinance prohib-
ited picketing in circumstances where it would be easy for an unwilling
recipient to ignore the message. Imagine, for example, a single, silent
picketer on the street; by turning away, the resident can avoid the
message.42 Even peaceful verbal messages may not always penetrate the
exterior of the home. By refusing to consider such options, the Court
broadly painted a picture of the captive audience within the home, and
minimized a court's unwanted obligation to scrutinize whether an at-
home recipient of unwanted information is able to avoid the speech.
2. The Captive Audience Outside the Home
The captive audience doctrine relating to speech outside the home is
also riddled with confusion and inconsistency. Courts emphasize two
principles in analyzing captive audiences outside the home. First, most
courts stress "the plain, if at times disquieting truth," that individuals are
inescapably captive audiences in society, forced to encounter many unde-
sirable and offensive circumstances.43 But unless the privacy interests
behind the doctrine are based on expectations of what is, rather than
what should be, private, the import of this observation is not clear. The
descriptive statement that people are subjected to unwanted stimuli is not
the same as saying that normatively they should be forced to endure
them. In other words, the fact that people encounter daily unwanted
messages does not tell us whether there are some circumstances in which
the government should intervene. The second principle emphasized by
the courts to some extent derives from the first: because of the inevitabil-
ity of undesired speech outside the home, the burden should be placed on
the viewer or recipient of information to avoid "further bombardment of
his sensibilities."'
40. Id at 484-85. But see New York Community Action Network Inc. v. Town of
Hempstead, 601 F. Supp. 1066 (D.R.I. 1978).
41. Klebanoff v. McMonagle, 552 A.2d 677, 679 (Pa. 1988). See also People Acting
Through Community Effort v. Doorley, 338 F. Supp. 574, 579 (D.R.I. 1972) (facts described
picketers as peaceful, carrying pictures of violations of building code allegedly permitted by
man whose house was picketed; no evidence of any verbal protest, yet court described home-
owner as trapped, helpless to respond, a "captive of those invading his privacy").
42. See Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360, 1367 (9th Cir. 1976) (political posters
do not invade the home; they can be avoided simply by not looking).
43. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210 (1975).
44. See ia at 211 (citation omitted); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298,
320-21 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60,
72 (1982).
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Both principles derive from Cohen v. California,4 " in which the
Supreme Court refused to find persons in a courthouse captive to the
message "Fuck the Draft," written on a young man's jacket. Justice
Harlan noted, in an oft-repeated passage:
IT]he mere presumed presence of unwitting listeners or viewers
does not serve automatically to justify curtailing all speech capable
of giving offense.... While this Court has recognized that govern-
ment may properly act in many situations to prohibit intrusion into
the privacy of the home of unwelcome views and ideas which can-
not be totally banned from the public dialogue,... we have at the
same time consistently stressed that "we are often captives"
outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable
speech. The ability of government, consonant with the Constitu-
tion, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is,
in other words, dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy
interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.46
What are "substantial privacy interests," and what are "essentially
intolerable invasions" of those interests? Must individuals be captive or
unable to turn away from the speech, in order for their privacy interests
to be invaded? Is it possible that individuals' privacy interests may be
intolerably invaded even if they are able to turn away from a message,
even if they never see the message?
Cohen made "captivity" a necessary condition before privacy inter-
ests are considered invaded, and linked captivity to an individual's ability
to turn away. No substantial privacy interests were invaded in Cohen
because those offended by the message "Fuck the Draft" could avert
their eyes. This directly conflicts with Pacifica; to know to turn away, a
person must either read the message in the first place, or perhaps be told
about it. The Court in Cohen, unlike that in Pacifica, protected only
continued exposure to the message, not the first glance. That individuals
would see the message on the jacket before turning away was not enough
to find them captive to the speech.
Decisions after Cohen have stressed the listener's responsibility to
avoid the speech when outside the home. In Erznoznik v. City of Jack-
sonville,47 for example, the Court invalidated a city ordinance prohibiting
the showing of films containing nudity by drive-in theaters whose screens
45. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). See generally William Cohen, A Look Back at Cohen v. Califor-
nia, 34 UCLA L. Rrv. 1595 (1987); Daniel A. Farber, Civilizing Public Discourse: An Essay
on Professor Bickel, Justice Harlan, and the Enduring Significance of Cohen v. California, 1980
DuKE L.J. 283.
46. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21 (citation omitted).
47. 422 U.S. 205 (1975). The Court in Erznoznik also was concerned about potential
overbreadth of the statute, which made it a public nuisance for a drive-in theater to exhibit any
motion picture displaying "male or female bare buttocks" if the movie was visible from any
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were visible from a public street. Offended viewers in public places read-
ily can avert their eyes from the movie screen, after the initial expo-
sure."48 Recently, a district court recognized the burden on listeners to
turn away from verbal messages, when it noted that normally "even a
captive audience has the burden of 'averting their ears' from offensive
speech."
49
A listener almost always has an ability to turn away from a message,
at least if it is written. In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,50 however, a
plurality of the Court held that any ability of riders in the city's transit
system to turn away from advertisements on its buses did not justify al-
lowing the speech or eliminate the captive audience problem." Peti-
tioner in Lehman, a candidate for state representative in Ohio, sought to
purchase card space in the transit system to promote his candidacy.
Although space was available, his request was rejected; the city accepted
only commercial advertisements, and did not accept any political or pub-
lic-issue advertisements on its vehicles. 2 In upholding the city's action
public place. See generally Ralph Artigliere, Comment, Pivacy vs Free Expression in Public
Areas Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975), 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 588 (1975).
48. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 211-12.
49. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Fla. 1990). See also
Weiss v. Patrick, 453 F. Supp. 717, 722 (D.R.I. 1978) (short of evidence of coercion in attempt
to speak to her, plaintiff's remedy is "simply the refusal to listen").
50. 418 U.S. 298 (1974). Thus, the Court in Lehman seemed to endorse Justice Douglas's
dissent in Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 468 (1952). There, the majority
permitted the broadcast of music in public buses, noting that "[h]owever complete [a railway
passenger's] right of privacy may be at home, it is substantially limited by the rights of others
when its possessor travels on a public thoroughfare .... Id at 464. Justice Douglas dissented
on the ground that "the man on the streetcar has no choice but to sit and listen, or perhaps to
sit and to try not to listen." Id at 469.
Lehman was recently distinguished in Penthouse International, Ltd. v. Koch, 599 F.
Supp. 1338, 1347-1349 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). There, the court held that the audience was not
captive to Penthouse advertisements on the subway station's walls, passways, and platforms.
The distinction between the bus and the subway platform is not obvious. The same ability to
turn the eyes from the offensive message exists. Individuals "need" to be on the platform for
the same reasons they need to take the buses. Although there may be greater ability to move
around the platform, that is not always true, as anyone who has taken the subways in New
York or Chicago during peak hours can attest.
See also Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Chicago Transit Auth., 592 F. Supp. 544, 555
(N.D. Il. 1984), which held that travelers in transit facilities are not a captive audience be-
cause it is not impossible for an unwilling audience to avoid exposure to abortion-related writ-
ten advertisements displayed on transit authority buses, trains, and facilities. The district
court here too, contrasted-and inverted-a Supreme Court decision. The court said that the
audience is not like that in Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952), which could
not avoid exposure to the verbal messages. The Court in'Pollak, however, had held that the
verbal message could be avoided!
51. Lehman, 418 U.S; at 307-08.
52. Id. at 299-300.
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as constitutional, the Court relied in part on the fact that the riders of the
system would be captive:
[The Court previously reasoned] that viewers of billboards and
streetcars had no choice or volition to observe such advertising and
had the message thrust upon them by all the arts and devises that
skill can produce.... The radio can be turned off, but not so the
billboard or street car placard.... The streetcar audience is a
captive audience. It is there as a matter of necessity, not of
choice.5 4
The opinion did not discuss the viewer's ability to look away from
the advertisement if offended. The only point the plurality made in this
regard was that riders cannot leave the streetcar.55 Certainly many indi-
viduals in Cohen were also unable to leave the courthouse, yet their abil-
ity to avert their eyes was unimpaired. The Court in Lehman confused
captivity in aplace with being captive to speech. Even though individuals
were not "free" to leave the bus, they still could avert their eyes from the
ad and look elsewhere.56
53. The Court's conclusion that the radio is easily turned off was ignored by the Court
several years later in Pacifca. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text. It also subverts
the traditional assumption that written messages are more easily avoided than verbal ones. See
supra note 16 and accompanying text.
54. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 302. Although there were other bases for the decision, Lehman
is now primarily regarded as a captive audience decision. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd.
v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975); Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073,
1081 n.18 (5th Cir. 1976). For criticism of Lehman, see Sheila N. Cahill, Note, The Public
Forum: Minimum Access, Equal Access, and the First Amendment, 28 STAN. L. Rtv. 117,
142-43 (1975). The Court's decision is particularly ironic given the City's decision to accept
commercial advertising on its vehicles. "Once a passenger's privacy has been invaded through
commercial ads, any additional invasion from political messages would seem to be of only
marginal importance." Paul A. Freund, The Supreme Court, 1973 Term-Foreword: On Pres-
idential Privilege, 88 HARV. L. REv. 149, 153-54 (1974). See generally, David D. Swartling,
Recent Development, Constitutional Law-The Public Forum in Nontraditional Areas Lehman
v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), 51 WASH. L. Rnv. 142 (1975).
55. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 302. The Court in Lehman relied on Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285
U.S. 105 (1932), in which Justice Brandeis observed that ads were "constantly before the eyes
of observers on the streets and in street cars to be seen without the exercise of choice or
volition on their part." Id. at 110.
56. Justice Douglas, in his concurrence, addressed the ability of the bus riders to avoid the
speech when he remarked that advertisements are constantly in front of the observers, and
thus, observers have no real ability to turn away. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 305-08. Although
there may be rare cases where the rider is so wedged into a position on a bus that it is physi-
cally impossible to move or even to turn his or her entire body, the eyes can still be averted or
shut to avoid the offending message. Douglas was speaking figuratively, advertisers use psy-
chological ploys to "compel" our viewing of their products. No scientific evidence, however,
was presented to support this conclusion. Once psychological techniques to ensure viewing a
picture are considered, moreover, it should be fair game on both sides. That is, psychological
devices such as selective perception, that people use to tune out messages that are offensive, or
conflict with their preconceived ideas, need to be considered. Only by balancing the psycho-
logical compulsion to view the ads against the well-established psychological avoidance tactics
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Finally, it is important to recognize that Lehman, like Pacifica and
to some extent, Frisby, deny speech to willing listeners. Because the
Court presumed in Lehman that some individuals might be offended,
those who would wish to view political or public issue advertisements
were denied that right. In this context, therefore, the captive audience
doctrine infringes not only upon a speaker's constitutional right to free
expression, but also upon other people's right to receive information.
In sum, the Court's treatment of the captive audience doctrine has
been inconsistent and limited. Instead of detailed analysis, the Court of-
fers conclusory statements that do not address the real issues, such as an
individual's obligation and/or ability to avoid the speech. At times,
courts consider physical entrapment in the place where speech appears to
be a sufficient condition for invoking the captive audience doctrine; they
do not discuss the ability to avoid the speech." At other times, courts
recognize that even though the individual is unable or unwilling to leave
the place, she can avoid the speech by throwing out the message, switch-
ing the channel, or turning her head.5" Thus, although ostensibly captive
in the place, the person is not a captive audience to the speech.
In some cases, any exposure to an offensive message is too great an
intrusion on the listener's rights. In others, the initial reception of the
message is protected, and the recipient has the responsibility for subse-
quently rejecting the communication. While some courts express con-
cern about the rights of willing listeners to receive the message, others
allow the virtual denial of speech, even to those desiring to hear.
B. Applying an Inconsistent Doctrine: Examples of Future Difficulties
By failing to sufficiently describe the parameters of the doctrine,
courts provide little guidance for future applications. Specifically, the
area most likely to engage the courts in the future-an area currently
being explored by numerous constitutional scholars 59 -is the role of the
can a court consider whether an individual is truly compelled to hear or see the speech. This
the Court did not do.
57. See, e.g., supra notes 27, 37 and 51 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., supra notes 18, 20, 46 and 49 and accompanying text.
59. See, eg., Matsuda, supra note 9, Lawrence, supra note 9; Nadine Strossen, Regulating
Racist Speech on Campus: 4 Modest Proposal?, 1990 DuKE L.J. 484; J. Peter Byrne, Racial
Insults and Free Speech Within the University, 79 GEo. L.J. 399 (1991); David Goldberger,
Sources of Judicial Reluctance to Use Psychic Harm as a Basis for Suppressing Racist, Sexist
and Ethnically Offensive Speech, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 1165 (1991); Bhavana Sontakay, Com-
ment, College and University Regulation of Racist Speech: Does Regulation Violate the First
Amendment?, 95 DICK. L. Rrv. 235 (1990); Deborah R. Schwartz, Note, First Amendment
Justification for Regulating Racial Speech on Campus, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 733 (1989-
90).
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captive audience doctrine in curtailing hate speech, particularly
(although by no means exclusively) such speech on college campuses.
Many civil libertarians are attempting to reconcile their desire to protect
freedom of speech, yet still recognize the real harms caused by hate
messages. One way to do this is to permit such speech except when de-
livered to a captive audience.
The question then becomes, when is an individual captive? For ex-
ample, some civil libertarians argue that racist speech generally cannot
be regulated consistent with the First Amendment, but that captive audi-
ences on college campuses can be protected from exposure to such
speech.' Professor Mari Matsuda, while supporting broad regulations
on racist speech, recently argued that "students on campus are analogous
to the captive audience that is afforded special [F]irst [A]mendment con-
sideration in other contexts. Students have fewer avenues of retreat.
Living on or near campus, studying in the library and interacting with
fellow students are integral parts of university life."6 1 Thus, the govern-
ment might be able to regulate speech in college dormitories, or even
elsewhere on the campus, based on the captive audience doctrine.
But statements that students on campus constitute a captive audi-
ence overgeneralize. Does this mean that the student is captive to speech
anywhere on campus, including, for example, any streets or outdoor ar-
eas that are part of the university? Even in the most obvious place for
assuming captivity-the college dormitory-many questions need fur-
ther analysis. Is a dormitory building like a private home, or is it only
the individual's personal room that is analogous to a residence? For ex-
ample, assume a student puts a poster that contains a racial epithet on
the outside of the door to her room. Is another student, living in the
room down the hall, captive? What if the offended student lives next
door and must pass the room to use the bathroom or to leave the dormi-
tory? Should the analysis differ if she lives a floor below and never (or
rarely) has to pass the poster? What if a notice for an organizational
meeting for a group devoted to "ridding the dorms of fags" is posted on
the dormitory bulletin board? Is a gay student who feels horrified by the
very idea of this group, captive to the message, so that he may insist on
the removal of the notice? Indeed, may the school refuse to allow the
notice to be posted on the assumption that gay and straight students
would be offended, and for them, even an initial glance would be too
great an assault?
To even begin to suggest answers to these questions based on the
60. See, eg., Strossen, supra note 59, at 505-06.
61. Matsuda, supra note 9, at 2372. See also Lawrence, supra note 9, at 456-57, 481.
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captive audience doctrine," we need to know why a home is a "castle";
why individuals have a right to privacy in their home that encompasses
the right not to hear. Should speech anywhere in a dormitory building
be considered the equivalent of speech which enters a home? As the Sev-
enth Circuit noted:
No Supreme Court case has defined the outer limits of what is
meant by the concept of "home." Is a home strictly limited to the
four walls of a building serving as a private residence? Or does the
concept of homes somehow encompass an area of peace and secur-
ity related to, but not strictly limited by, the walls of a house?63
If a dormitory is determined to be like a home, then the question is
whether the courts would impose any burden on the unwilling listener to
avoid the speech. If a court were to follow Frisby and Pacifica, it pre-
sumably would not matter if any student is forced to actually see the
message, and no responsibility to look away or take a different route to
avoid the offensive speech would be imposed on the student. After all,
the Frisby Court did not rely on any evidence that the homeowner was in
any way disturbed in his routine, or even heard the protests within the
house, in finding him captive."4 One glance, as in Pacifica, might consti-
tute an assault.
Alternatively, the court could require the individual to turn away, as
in Bolger and Consolidated Edison. If so, we have no way of determining
what is a reasonable burden: we know that the obligation to take mail
from the mailbox to the garbage can is not onerous, but beyond that, no
case law exists. Should the burden of turning one's head when passing
62. There may be other ways to regulate speech on college campuses. First, the Court
could simply decide to prohibit such speech by reviving the largely discredited group libel
doctrine, first upheld in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). But see American Book-
sellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 331 n.3 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986)
(subsequent cases "had so washed away the foundations of Beauharnais that it could not be
considered authoritative); Robert C. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography,
Blasphemy and the First Amendment, 76 CAL. L. REv. 297, 330 (1988) ("Beauharnais is...
damaged goods."). The fighting words doctrine could be invoked in appropriate circum-
stances. See Chaplinsky v. New Hamphsire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). But see Stephen W. Gard,
Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 531, 536 (1980) (the doctrine is now "noth-
ing more than a quaint remnant of an earlier morality that has no place in a democratic society
dedicated to the principle of free expression"). Or, the courts could decide that racist speech
interferes with the educational opportunity guaranteed to all students under Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Lawrence, supra note 9, at 438-40.
63. Schultz v. Frisby, 807 F.2d 1339, 1352 (7th Cir. 1986). See also Richard D. Bernstein,
Note, First Amendment Limits on Tort Liabilityfor Words Intended to Inflict Severe Emotional
Distress, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1749 (1985) (arguing that notion of spatial privacy could be
applied to other areas where recipient found it necessary to be, such as stores, and possibly
restaurants).
64. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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the offensive poster outweigh the right of others, in their home also, to
hear and speak?
Even if an analogy can be drawn between a dorm and a home, what
about the rest of the college campus? The fact that the campus might
constitute a "residential neighborhood" likely would not be enough to
grant captivity status to the student outside the dormitory. That argu-
ment was unsuccessfully asserted in Collin v. Smith, 5 when Jewish resi-
dents of Skokie-many of them Holocaust survivors-argued that the
Nazi march in their village deeply offended them and that they were cap-
tives to the speech. The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument, noting
that residents need not be a captive audience, because they could simply
avoid the Village Hall, the place of the Nazi march, for thirty minutes on
a Sunday afternoon.66 Thus, entire campuses would not be viewed as
homes, and presumably some burden would be placed on students to
avoid unwanted messages.
The question then becomes, what is a reasonable burden in this con-
text? It seems grossly unfair to require a black student to take a different
route to class to avoid racist slurs. The courts, which thus far have spo-
ken generally about the ability to turn away and avert one's eyes or ears
outside of the home, provide no answer to whether this is too great a
burden to impose on the listener. Any analogy to Collin v. Smith be-
comes weak at this point, because the court there assumed that individu-
als would not be subject to any significant hardship in staying away from
the Village Hall on a day it was closed.
Outside of the university context, difficult questions remain concern-
ing the regulation of hate speech based on the captive audience doctrine.
What about a woman at work who knows that her boss keeps a porno-
graphic picture in his office but never has to see it?6" Is she captive be-
cause she must be at work, like the riders in Lehman who had no choice
65. 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
66. Id. at 1200, 1206. See also Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415,
420 (1971) (right of privacy does not exist beyond physical confines of home).
67. Collin, 578 F.2d at 1207.
68. As I argued in an earlier article, this speech can be curtailed if it discriminates against
women, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1981). See
Strauss, supra note 10, at 46-49. Here I consider only whether the captive audience doctrine
can be employed to silence the speaker. Several courts have employed the captive audience
doctrine in the workplace. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. 760 F. Supp. 1486,
1535 (N.D. Fla. 1991); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 503 F. Supp. 383,402 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
(workers at jobsite were captive to harassing messages delivered over loudspeakers; only way
to avoid speech was to quit jobs). Interestingly, the court in Rizzo contrasted this situation
with that in Lehman in which, the district court claimed, it would be easy to avoid the offen-
sive advertising by averting one's eyes. Of course, this is contrary to the holding in Lehman,
and indicates at least one lower court's dissatisfaction with that Supreme Court decision.
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but to take the bus? Or is the important point that she not only can
easily turn away, as in Erznoznik, but she in fact need not even look at it
in the first place? Would it make a difference if the poster were placed
near the drinking fountain so she cannot help but glance at it when she
goes for a drink? This assumes that the burden on the unwilling viewer
should not include forcing her to find another fountain, or even bringing
her own bottled water to work. On what principled basis can a line be
drawn between a reasonable and unreasonable burden? What if the wo-
man is told about the picture by the drinking fountain, and so averts her
eyes each time she goes by? Presumably, then, she is not captive to the
message. Yet if she looks once (or even knows that it is there from de-
scriptions by others), is that enough of an assault on her senses, as in
Pacifica, to constitute captivity?
Finally, consider a Jewish man who is followed down the street by a
woman shouting anti-Semitic slogans. He continues his walk, uninter-
rupted, proceeds at precisely the same pace, and goes to the same desti-
nation that he had intended. In fact, if questioned, he may not be able to
repeat the words used by the woman; in essence he tuned her out. Was
he captive to the speech? An audience has never been found captive in a
public place like a street. Is his psychological rejection of the message
equivalent to averting his eyes, and are others under an obligation to at
least attempt to tune out the message?69
The captive audience doctrine provides little guidance for resolving
these issues. Court decisions that discuss the captive audience doctrine
seem idiosyncratic; even those principles that can be generalized, like the
obligation to turn away from speech, soon run into unanswered questions
about their meaning. Calling an audience "captive" substitutes for an
analysis of when individuals are truly unable to escape an unwanted
message because the burden of turning away is too onerous. As a result,
the case law forms a patchwork of decisions difficult to weave into a
consistent pattern. It provides little guidance for the hard questions sure
to arise.
H. The Dangers of a Slogan: The Problems with Imprecision
A. The Risk of Curtailing Speech
The captive audience doctrine's elusiveness creates the danger that it
will be used to silence speech in circumstances that do not justify restrict-
69. See Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets
and Name Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133, 175 (1982) (racial insults make audience
captive; they cannot avert their ears).
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ing the speaker's First Amendment rights. The concept of a captive au-
dience is an elastic theory that could expand to curtail most free
expression rights.70 Indeed, courts have been willing to expand the doc-
trine. For example, in a recent decision concerning the obscenity of rap
music lyrics, the judge noted almost casually that "a person lying on a
public beach, sitting in a public park, walking down the street or sitting
in his automobile for the light to change is, in a sense, a captive audi-
ence."71 The court did not make clear the "sense" in which the person is
captive. Under this definition, the right to freedom of speech guaranteed
by the First Amendment would soon become illusory. Once a person is
deemed captive in every public setting, the audience has virtually abso-
lute power to control the speaker's right to free speech. The fact that
someone is offended, or does not like the message, is sufficient to curtail
another's First Amendment rights. The audience acquires "veto power,"
and the captive audience doctrine could be used to "undermine the entire
freedom of speech fabric," 72 particularly with respect to unorthodox
views.
This danger is especially acute because the captive audience doctrine
allows a court to curtail even political expression as in Lehman, speech
that lies at the core of the First Amendment.73 Even when employed to
limit merely "offensive speech," however, the captive audience doctrine
suppresses messages entitled to constitutional protection. As the
Supreme Court recently noted, "If there is a bedrock principle underly-
ing the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive
or disagreeable." 74 Yet, this solicitude for offensive speech ends if the
court determines that a captive audience is present. Although in a few
other circumstances courts have regulated offensive speech,7" it is pri-
marily when the offensive message is delivered to a captive audience that
70. See Krattenxmaker & Power, supra note 31, at 1228-37.
71. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 593 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
72. As Professor Nimmer cautions, "[To regard... involuntary but merely momentary
contact with the speech of others as enough to invoke a captive audience basis for suppressing
the unwelcome speech would largely undermine the entire freedom of speech fabric." MEL-
VILLE B. NIMMER, ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 1-33 (1984).
73. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (citing Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980) ("This Court has recognized that expression on public issues
'has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.' "); First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (speech on matter of public concern
lies at the "heart of the First Amendment's protection").
74. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). See also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312
(1988); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
75. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
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courts permit such speech to be regulated.76
B. The Promotion of Content-Based Discrimination
The captive audience doctrine poses unique dangers to free expres-
sion because it permits a court to engage in viewpoint- and content-based
discrimination. Traditionally, restrictions on speech must be viewpoint-
and content-neutral to pass constitutional muster: "[A]bove all else, the
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict ex-
pression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its con-
tent. . . . There is an 'equality of status in the field of ideas,' and
government must afford all points of view an ...opportunity to be
heard.
77
When protecting a captive audience from offensive speech, however,
courts by definition make distinctions based on content or point of view.
Inevitably, the court must look to the content of the speech to see if it is
sufficiently offensive to warrant regulation.7" For example, the court
likely will not find that a stranger stopping me on the street to offer me
unwanted child-rearing advice satisfies the Cohen standard. If that same
stranger, however, stopped me to give me a picture of the latest Pent-
house Pet of the Month, the result might be different. If a student at a
required school assembly urged students to vote for him because of his
anti-drug stance, the court would not likely find cause to restrict his
speech even if some students were offended. Yet if that same student
were to urge the use of drugs, the speech likely could be restricted based
in part on a captive audience theory.79
Even though some speech restrictions based on captive audience
doctrine have been content-neutral, content-based discrimination has
been allowed. In Lehman, for example, the Court sustained the city's
policy distinguishing acceptable and non-acceptable advertisements
based on content. Ironically, the speech prohibited was political; com-
76. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988) ("The First Amendment permits the gov-
ernment to prohibit offensive speech as intrusive when the 'captive' audience cannot avoid the
objectionable speech.").
77. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) (footnote omitted).
78. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text. See also Upper Midwest Booksellers v.
City of Minneapolis, 602 F. Supp. 1361, 1371 (D. Minn. 1985) (while content-neutral regula-
tion is a fundamental principle of First Amendment, court has considered content of speech to
protect listener privacy in home or when captive audience cannot avoid speech).
79. See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). See also Brian A.
Freeman, The Supreme Court and First Amendment Rights of Students in the Public School
Classroom A Proposed Model ofAnalysis, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 20-24 (1984) (drawing
analogy between classroom and facts in Lehman).
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mercial advertisements were permitted. 0 Rowan, too, involved a con-
tent-based restriction on speech. The homeowners could not select
whatever mail they did not want to receive; only mailings that were of-
fensive because of their "lewd and salacious character" could be barred.
Thus, the statute restricted only speech related to sex; mail that was of-
fensive because of its political or religious content was outside the scope
of the regulation."1 Likewise, in Pacifica, the Court endorsed content-
based discrimination; the FCC could distinguish between "indecent" and
other language for the purposes of regulation. The Court upheld as con-
stitutional the commission's ability to impose civil sanctions for uttering
"any obscene, indecent or profane language by means of radio
communication. '82
Given these dangers in utilizing the captive audience doctrine, and
considering the inconsistent, and at times incoherent, approach of the
Court, the question becomes, what now? Should the captive audience
doctrine be eliminated from First Amendment jurisprudence? Or should
an attempt be made to reformulate it to make it more precise and useful?
Before taking either step, the policies behind the doctrine must be consid-
ered. What, if any, substance lies behind the slogan?
IM. Should There Be a Captive Audience Doctrine?
Why is there a doctrine that protects an individual's right not to
hear? To evaluate the balance the courts have drawn between the right
to speak and the right not to be spoken to, we must consider the values
behind protecting the captive and even the non-captive audience from
speech. Yet here again, the courts' analyses have been woefully lacking.
Courts typically invoke the phrases "the right to be let alone" or "the
right to privacy" as the justifications for the captive audience doctrine.83
80. The plurality did not discuss the issue of content-based regulation; Justice Douglas,
who cast the fifth vote in favor of the city policy, believed that all advertising should be ex-
cluded, but because the plaintiff had not urged this position, he concurred in the exclusion of
political ads. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 308 (1974). See Marilyn R.
Kaplan, Note, Commercial Speech and the Right to Privacy: Constitutional Implications of
Regulating Unsolicited Telephone Calls, 15 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 277, 306 (1980).
81. Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content The Peculiar Case of
Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CH. L. R v. 81, 84 (1978).
82. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976).
83. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. The right to privacy is important in other
First Amendment areas, such as the right not to speak, West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), the right not to take loyalty oaths, Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384
U.S. 11 (1966), or not to have to declare membership in organizations. See Robert B. McKay,
The Right of Privacy: Emanations and Intimations, 64 MICH. L. REv. 259, 274 (1965).
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These phrases have an almost mystical draw on our emotions; 4 they are
seen as an ultimate good."5
Yet, why is the right to be let alone really important? The phrase
itself is so broad as to be virtually useless. It does not accurately depict
our society. We do not have an absolute right to be let alone; we all must
pay taxes, observe traffic signals, and breathe the same air. Described
broadly, the right is meaningless, because virtually every government or
individual act becomes a violation of another's ability to be let alone.
Moreover, it does not necessarily describe the way things should be in
society. For example, the right to be let alone justifies ignoring a drown-
ing person's cries for help. 6 It excuses the failure to participate in the
democratic process.
In an attempt to define more precisely the right to be let alone,
courts often justify the captive audience doctrine based on a right to pri-
vacy. This simply begs the question: what does the right to privacy
mean, particularly in the context of the right not to receive information?
"Few concepts... are more vague or less amenable to definition... than
privacy."87 Although the right to privacy has long existed in common
law, and more recently in constitutional theory, there is little consensus
among either legal scholars or philosophers on a definition of privacy.88
As Professor Thompson remarked, "Perhaps the most striking thing
84. One author described privacy as one of the "warmest" words in the literature. Robert
B. Dixon, Jr., The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for an Expanded Law of Pri-
vacy?, 64 MICH. L. Rv. 197, 199 (1965).
85. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of
happiness.... They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone... the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."). See generally
Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv. 233, 234 (1977).
Privacy, of course, is a valued concept reflected in a number of constitutional provisions
including the Fourteenth Amendment, see infra note 94 and accompanying text; the Second
Amendment, see United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875); the Fourth Amend-
ment, see United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); and the Fifth Amendment, see Tehan v.
Scott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966). See generally Thomas I. Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a
Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. Rn'V. 219 (1965).
86. See Michael A. Weinstein, The Uses of Privacy in the Good Life, 13 NOMOS 88, 90
(1971).
87. See Dixon, supra note 84, at 199.
88. See Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. Rnv. 275, 275-6
(1974). As Professors Wasserstrom and Seidman recently noted, in the context of the Fourth
Amendment, "moral philosophers who have thought about privacy do not speak with one
voice. On the contrary, they are hopelessly divided about what privacy is; about whether it is a
value in itself, or whether it is only... valuable because of its consequences; ... about what
claims the word privacy encompasses; and even about whether it describes a coherent concept
at all." Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitu-
tional Theory, 77 GEo. L.J. 19, 59-60 (1988).
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about the right to privacy is that nobody seems to have any very clear
idea what it is." 89
The problem is that courts prohibit the speaker's right to free ex-
pression, and at times, other's right to hear, based on these vague but
rhetorically powerful concepts. Once an audience is found "captive," the
right to be let alone or the right to privacy are invoked to outweigh, with
very little analysis, any free speech interests of the speaker and even the
right of others to hear. Not that these rights are without any substance;
constitutional protections of privacy have ensured citizens some of their
most-precious rights. Although moral philosophers cannot agree on
what privacy means, "in contemporary legal discourse ... it is uncon-
troversial that some value should be attached to privacy." 90 Yet an ac-
curate weighing of First Amendment interests cannot occur without an
understanding of what the right to be let alone and the right to privacy
really mean in the context of the captive audience doctrine.
The right to privacy and the right to be let alone, therefore, need to
be dissected, unpacked, and more specifically defined.91 Is there any sub-
stance to the right not to hear, or is it, too, just a slogan? Three specific
interests underlie the right to be let alone in the captive audience context:
the right to make individual choices (autonomy); the right to repose; and
the right to be free from offense. In each case, there exists some impor-
tant value to society worth protecting. Because courts do not focus di-
rectly on these values, however, and instead simply assert the right to be
let alone in conclusory terms, the captive audience doctrine as now devel-
oped imprecisely advances these three interests.
A. The Right to Choose'
One of the rights courts traditionally accept under the umbrella of
the right to privacy is freedom from intrusion in certain decision-making
processes.92 The right to make our own choices is essential to our con-
ception of ourselves as free thinking, independent, autonomous individu-
als.93 The government, therefore, may not violate a right to privacy by
89. Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AF=. 295, 295 (1975).
See also Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law--Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong? 31 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 326 (1966).
90. Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 88, at 61.
91. Cf. Thomson, supra note 89, at 295-310 (right to privacy can be broken down to other
more specific rights). But see Thomas Scanlon, Thomson on Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AF. 315
(1975) (criticizing Thomson).
92. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1975).
93. See generally Roger M. Smith, The Constitution and Autonomy. 60 TEx. L. REv. 175
(1982); David L. Bazelon, Probing Privacy, 12 GONZ. L. Rnv. 587, 589 (1977) (privacy in-
cludes right to uphold each person's right to be different, to have opinions of his or her own
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restricting someone's ability to make certain critical intimate decisions
about his or her own life. In establishing the constitutional right to
purchase and use contraceptives 94 and to obtain an abortion,95 the court
used the term privacy to mean an individual's right as an autonomous
being to make these choices.
Forced listening by definition removes decision-making authority
from the individual. Thus, for example, the statute in Rowan-permits
unwilling recipients to exercise their choice not to receive certain mail.
In this way, the law fosters their autonomy; it permits them to decide for
themselves what mail they wish to receive and read.96
Understanding that the right not to hear is more specifically based
on an individual's right to make choices, however, does not provide a
way to determine the weight of that interest. Some choices are more
important to our sense of autonomy than others. Certain decisions, for
example, about medical treatment,97 about reproduction,98 about child-
rearing9 9 are typically left with the individual, free from outside interfer-
ence. We view these intimate decisions as central to what it means to
control our own destiny, our own bodies. While the individual's right to
make decisions may have some worth in and of itself, the real weight of
that value can only be assessed if there is some independent reason why
and to make choices for himself or herself); J. Harrie Wilkinson III & G. Edward White,
Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 563, 589-90 (1977) (pri-
vacy means not only right to seclusion, but freedom to make decision about certain personal
matters); Elizabeth L. Beardsley, Privacy: Autonomy and Selective Disclosure, 13 NOMOS 56,
57-58 (1971) (privacy violated if person restricts another's power to determine whether to
perform an act or undergo an experience); Arnold Simmel, Privacy is Not an Isolated Freedom,
13 NOMOS 71, 73 (1971) (privacy lets people develop a position in opposition to social pres-
sures; this is one of central contributions of individuality, of distinct and independent selves).
94. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
95. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113.
96. See Beardsley, supra note 93, at 58 (infliction of unwanted noise restricts freedom of
choice). See also Troyer v. Town of Babylon, 483 F. Supp. 1135, 1138 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)
("Mhe Constitution does not allow government to create a rebuttable presumption that peo-
ple do not wish to be exposed to a particular class of ideas, or mode of expression. To override
strong [F]irst [A]mendment interests, the individual deserving privacy must assume the bur-
den of indicating the choice to be left alone. The role left to the states is to facilitate individual
choice.") (emphasis added).
97. See RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF IN-
FORMED CONSENT (1986); JAMES E. LUDLAM, INFORMED CONSENT (1978).
98. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
99. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (invalidating ordinance excluding
some extended families from living in the city); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (state
law dictating to parents what language their children should speak is unconstitutional); Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish parents have right to determine educational
upbringing of children after eighth grade).
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making this particular choice is important. 100
We must decide with care which personal decisions deserve protec-
tion as part of our right to privacy, as part of what it means to be an
individual. Otherwise, the right to choose will be invoked "as often as
the proverbial cry of 'wolf'," and its meaning "if it was ever clear, [will]
become diluted and uncertain through overgenerous applications to a
wide variety of situations."'1°' Is the right to choose not to listen to or see
certain messages.an aspect of autonomy that should be protected? To the
extent that speech is powerful, that words have the potential to alter our
innermost thoughts, to convince, persuade, move, and hurt us, the ability
to choose for ourselves what ideas and thoughts we want to be exposed to
is worth protecting. Like the choice of whether and when to procreate,
speech, in many ways, defines who we are as individuals.102
The question remains, however, whether the captive audience doc-
trine is necessary to preserve our right to choose what to hear. For ex-
ample, in Rowan, the ability to tell the Postmaster General what mail not
to forward, preserved the choice not to receive and see certain offensive
mail. This argument defeats itself. Even if there were no statute in
Rowan allowing the person to reject mail, the recipient could still exer-
cise his or her choice about what mail to read. The mail would be deliv-
ered and the person who chooses not to read it could simply throw it
away. The value of preserving the individual's choice remains inviolate.
Assuming that there is usually some way, even if onerous, to avoid the
speech, the individual can still choose not to hear or see it. The right to
choose is inherent in the notion of escape from the speech; the individual
has the choice whether to hear the speech or leave the area. The right to
choose, however, could provide a way to evaluate whether the listener
should bear the burden of avoiding the speech. If the choice is not one
that could be freely made, then the court could find the burden to be
unreasonable and the person captive.
For example, consider an individual in a long line at the airport,
waiting to purchase tickets for a flight. After waiting for twenty minutes
and inching towards the front, she is confronted by a member of the
Hare Krishna sect who wants to discuss his religion and who ignores her
pleas to go away. The person in line has a number of choices. She can
turn her head away and try not to listen. She can put her hands over her
100. See Gerety, supra note 85, at 275, n.153 (all compulsion cannot be invasion of privacy,
need concept of intimacy of personal identity).
101. McKay, supra note 83, at 272.
102. See, e.g., David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral The-
ory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. Rnv. 45 (1974); Martin H. Redish, The Value of
Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591 (1982).
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ears. She can leave the line. The court would need to consider the rea-
sonableness and efficacy of each alternative. If the final one-leaving the
line-is the only one that realistically would avoid the message,10 3 a
court might find it an unreasonable burden. Although in one sense the
traveler is physically fully capable of removing herself from the line, in
reality the choice may be illusory; if she leaves the line she may risk
missing the flight. The traveler has no choice but to listen. 1°
The right to choose is a value worth protecting and is served by the
captive audience doctrine. But by itself the right to choose is inconclu-
sive. Courts must decide the question of what is an undue restriction on
the right to choose. The value thus requires the court to analyze the
possible choices available to the listener in avoiding the speech; it does
not necessarily compel the conclusion that the speaker's right to free ex-
pression should be infringed.
B. The Right to Repose
In addition to the value in allowing people the choice of what to
hear or see, the right to be let alone may be worthwhile to preserve tran-
quility and repose. Restated, then, the right is really the right not to be
bothered. It is the right not to be stopped while walking to school, not to
be interrupted by a phone call or a doorbell ringing, not to have to inter-
act with another.
Thus defined, why is this right important? To some extent, the right
to repose is based on notions of autonomy; it protects the ability of peo-
ple to choose to be left alone. Independently, the right to repose serves
103. For example, the volume of the speech may make turning the head impossible. This
may also impede the efficacy of putting hands over the ears; or perhaps that option is not
feasible because the traveler, although unwilling to listen to the Hare Krishna, may need to
listen to others as she stands in line.
104. In International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 721 F. Supp. 572
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), the district court held unconstitutional the Port Authority of New York's
policy prohibiting the distribution of literature to, and the solicitation of contributions from,
persons in the passenger terminal at various airports. The court held that the airport was a
public forum, and rejected any captive audience problem:
Defendant further argues that the presence of captive audiences distinguishes the
airports from the traditional public fora of streets and parks.... With this conten-
tion, we do not agree. Captive audience group[s] [form] outside city concert halls,
movie theaters, and outdoor concession stands to the same extent as they form at
airport ticket counters, baggage conveyer belts, and security checkpoints.... Such
concerns, however, are the appropriate subject of reasonable time, place and manner
restrictions, not blanket prohibitions on expressive activity.
Id at 578.
The court also rejected any analogy to Lehman as farfetched, but added that
"[d]efendant's reliance on Lehman might be more persuasive were plaintiffs seeking access to
the aircraft, themselves." Id at 578 n.8.
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other values: when we are let alone and not subject to interruption or
disturbance, we can use that time to engage in private behavior, to de-
velop intimate relationships, reflect on ideas, or vent our emotions.10 5
This right to repose, to engage in private behavior, to enjoy tranquil-
ity and peace, has been most clearly protected with respect to the home.
There should be some place to go for peace, to get away from it all, to be
by ourselves. Although the familiar saying "a man's home is his castle"
has not been more eloquently transposed by the Supreme Court into a
broad-based protection of privacy in the home, 06 the Court has consist-
ently viewed "protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the
home... [as a state interest] of the highest order in a free and civilized
society."10 7
Although the right to tranquility and peace are values worth pro-
tecting, these rights do not necessarily justify the way courts define the
right not to hear, either within or without the home. Within the home,
individuals are deemed captive without any showing that their right to
repose has been violated in an unacceptable way. In Frisby, for example,
the Supreme Court did not indicate whether the target of the picketing
was in any way affected by the acts of the protesters.10 8 At a minimum, a
court should require some showing that interests worth protecting are
being infringed, rather than rely on conclusory statements that a person's
privacy interests are being invaded. Even within their homes, people are
frequently and inevitably confronted with unwanted messages, the couple
next door fighting, the man on the street chastising his children, the dog
a few houses down barking, or the book with the unanticipated offensive
passage. Concededly, the fact that some unwanted stimuli penetrate the
home does not mean that all should be able to get in.'0 9 But it does
105. See Bazelon, supra note 93, at 590 (privacy assures space to reflect on one's choices,
determine the direction of one's life, and permit emotional release); CHARLES FRIED, AN
ANATOMY OF VALUES 142 (1970) (privacy promotes human relationships); Edward J. Blous-
tein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv.
962, 974 (1964) ("He who may intrude upon another at will is the master of the other and, in
fact, intrusion is a primary weapon of the tyrant.").
106. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
107. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980). See also Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394
U.S. 111, 125-26 (1969) (Black, J., concurring) ("I believe that the homes of men, sometimes
the last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick, can be protected by government from
noisy, marching, tramping, threatening picketers and demonstrators ...."). See generally
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNrED STATES 407 (1948) ("Freedom of
the home is as important as freedom of speech.").
108. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988).
109. Unlike picketing, moreover, none of these examples include speech targeted against
the homeowner.
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demonstrate the need to prove that the infringement on the right to re-
pose is sufficiently serious to warrant governmental restriction on speech.
The burden of showing an infringement of the right to repose in the
home is not onerous. An example of where such a finding likely could be
made is in Klebanoff v. McMonagle."10 The Klebanoffs sought, and the
court granted, an injunction to prevent picketing or demonstrations in
the street directly in front of their home. The Klebanoff home had been
picketed many Sundays for almost a year by twenty to thirty picketers
who were members of an anti-abortion organization. The picketers car-
ried signs and shouted comments to Dr. Klebanoff, and once attempted
to taunt him into a physical confrontation. The family felt compelled to
keep their son in the house in order to avoid the picketers. Mrs. Kleba-
noff left her house for the sake of her son and for her own emotional
stability when no one else was home during the demonstrations. The
family's reaction seemed reasonable under the circumstances because evi-
dence was introduced that the picketers might become violent."' Thus,
the Klebanoff family could not enjoy the tranquility of their home; they
could not use their home any longer for private endeavors during the
times that the picketing took place. These facts should have been suffi-
cient to permit the court to weigh the parties' right not to hear in order
to protect their right to repose and tranquility in the home, against the
free speech rights of the picketers and against the rights of any willing
listeners to hear.
Similarly, a time, place, and manner restriction" 2 that prohibits
loudspeakers in residential areas above a certain decibel level-or even
prohibits such noise entirely during certain hours-may be justified
based on the value of repose; an individual's right to repose presumably
includes the ability to keep out, at least at certain times, unduly loud
noises. A city ordinance like that in Frisby condemning all picketing,
however, would be unconstitutionally overbroad under the standard I
propose. Certain kinds of picketing, such as silent picketing or even
peaceful picketing by a small group, should not be assumed, without
proof, to significantly infringe on a homeowner's right to repose.11 3
110. 552 A.2d 677 (Pa. 1988). See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
111. Klebanoff, 552 A.2d at 679.
112. Time, place, and manner restrictions are content-neutral regulations of speech within
the public forum. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) ("[t]he government may
enforce reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions [only if] the restrictions 'are content-
neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample
alternative channels of communication.' "). Id at 177.
113. See, eg., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (silent picketing did not disturb
function of library).
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Beyond the confines of the home, the captive audience doctrine is
not tailored to protecting repose. Return for a minute to the hypotheti-
cal of the Jewish man being followed by the person spewing anti-Semitic
slurs. As noted, a court would probably not find him to be captive.1 14
Yet clearly his right to tranquility and peace is being violated. Assume
that the Jewish man walks by a person standing on the street corner
shouting anti-Semitic slogans through a bull horn. He hears what the
person says and walks away, still hearing it for a short time. There is
little doubt that the court would not silence the hate speech on the basis
of either the captive audience doctrine or the listener's right to privacy.
Yet certainly his sense of peace and tranquility has been greatly
disturbed.
In sum, although the captive audience doctrine can be justified by
the important goal of protecting repose, the principles of the doctrine are
overprotective of repose within the home, and not sufficiently protective
of repose outside the home. The answer may be that the doctrine needs
an alternative justification, at least when employed outside of private
residences. The previous hypothetical, concerning the anti-Semitic slurs,
reveals the final value that may be worth protecting in the right to be let
alone: a right to be free of certain speech that is offensive.
C. The Right to Be Free from Offensive Speech
Perhaps the meaning of the right to be let alone is that we should
not have to listen to speech that offends. But why is this so? The argu-
ments here sound circular: captive audiences should be protected from
offensive speech because people should not be forced to hear such speech.
When does the offensive nature of the speech justify its regulation?
In fact, offensive speech is by itself valuable. It is often an integral
part of the message; to exclude offensiveness "would exclude from public
consideration many of the ideas of the strident critics who have often
made the most significant contributions to the public debate."' 15 More-
over, one person's offensive message is another's masterpiece; it is not for
the government to determine what messages are "worthy" enough to be
part of the marketplace of ideas. 1 6 In other words, the notion that
speech is offensive should not be enough to regulate it, even when it is
delivered to a captive audience. Any interest in protecting people from
114. It is conceivable that a court would find that his privacy was being invaded in an
intolerable manner; however, because courts seem to require captivity as a necessary condition
before finding an invasion of privacy, such a holding is unlikely.
115. Frederick Schauer, Response: Pornography and the First Amendment, 40 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 605, 615 (1979).
116. See Farber, supra note 45, at 302.
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such speech likely collapses into the previous two interests: the right to
choose not to hear offensive messages and the right to repose. Positing a
right to be free from offensiveness does not really advance the analysis.
Offensive speech, however, should not be viewed as a monolith.
Probing deeper, there may be a certain value in protecting people from
speech that may fall loosely within a category called "offensive speech."
Offensive speech may cause some degree of emotional distress that justi-
fies regulation. This distress is most clearly associated with hate speech:
research has consistently demonstrated that insults and epithets based on
group characteristics hurt the person to whom they are directed.117 Pro-
fessor Man Matsuda eloquently described the "spirit murder"'1 18 caused
by racist speech: "[T]he negative effects of hate messages are real and
immediate for the victims. Victims of vicious hate propaganda have ex-
perienced physiological symptoms and emotional distress ranging from
fear in the gut, [to] rapid pulse rate and difficulty in breathing, night-
mares, post-traumatic stress disorder, hypertension, psychosis, and
suicide." '119
But is the captive audience doctrine suited to protecting this inter-
est? Currently, the doctrine is not aligned with protecting individuals
from emotional distress. Emotional distress is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition for invoking the captive audience doctrine. First,
there certainly is no requirement that such distress be proven before an
audience is deemed captive. Moreover, even if there is emotional distress
from exposure to speech, the court will not necessarily conclude that the
listener is captive. For example, in Collin v. Smith, 120 the court conceded
that many Holocaust survivors and other Jewish residents of Skokie
would suffer real and significant emotional disturbance from the presence
of Nazis in their community. The unwilling listeners, however, were still
able to physically avoid the speech by not coming near the town hall, and
117. See Matsuda, supra note 9, at 2335-41 (detailing severe physical and psychological
harm resulting from hate speech); Lawrence, supra note 9, at 462 (same); Christine A. Lit-
tleton, Feminist Jursprudence: The Difference Method Makes, 41 STAN. L. REv. 751, 751-75
(1989) (describing effects of sexual harassment). Offensive speech that is directed at an individ-
ual and likely to provoke a violent response may be punished consistent with the First Amend-
ment under the "fighting words doctrine." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942). The fighting words doctrine has been narrowly construed by the courts, and the
Supreme Court has not upheld a conviction under the doctrine in over 40 years. See Stephen
W. Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 Wash. U. L.Q. 531, 538 (1980). See also Kent
Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech? 42 RUTGERS L. REv. 287, 291-
98 (1990).
118. Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as
the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 127, 129 (1987).
119. Matsuda, supra note 9, at 2336.
120. 578 F.2d 1197, 1200 (7th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
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thus they were not captive. 12 1 If the value behind the right not to hear
was truly freedom from emotional distress, the captive audience doctrine
has not been interpreted to maximize that goal.
In addition to protecting individuals from messages that emotionally
hurt, we may want to protect people from offensive messages that harass
or intimidate. Harassing phone calls or other threatening or coercive
messages may be prohibited because of the harm they cause to the un-
willing recipient of the speech. Mere offensiveness is not enough to war-
rant protection for an individual under the captive audience doctrine.
Some specific and definable harm attributable to the offensiveness must
be demonstrated.
IV. Rethinking the Captive Audience Doctrine:
A Proposed Solution
The captive audience doctrine is in disarray. It is a doctrine without
clear definition, and thus renders future applications problematic. The
courts apply an amorphous concept-the right to be let alone-without
any real analysis of what that right means. The doctrine is not consist-
ently applied, and when applied, it often entails content- and viewpoint-
based distinctions. It is necessary to replace the slogan with a detailed,
substantive analysis.
The captive audience doctrine is worth preserving to the extent that
it can protect the important values identified in Part III. The doctrine
should be retained only if courts engage in careful balancing that ex-
pressly identifies and weighs the competing interests. The values in favor
of the right not to hear are only half of the balance. In using the captive
audience test, the courts must also carefully identify and weigh the effects
on freedom of speech.
Accordingly, in employing the captive audience doctrine, the courts
should expressly weigh three factors. First, how great is the justification
for protecting an unwilling audience? Second, how difficult is it for the
listener to avoid the speech, and would avoiding the speech achieve the
goals of the captive audience doctrine? Finally, how significant is the
infringement on the First Amendment right to freedom of expression?
A. How Great Is the Justification?
First, how compelling is the justification for protecting the unwilling
audience? As described in Part III, a court must carefully consider the
precise value(s) furthered by the captive audience doctrine in a particular
121. Id. at 1207.
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case. Does the government's regulation protect someone's freedom of
choice with regard to receiving information? This would be true only if
the regulation is like that in Rowan,122 where the government imple-
ments the express choice of the individual, or if the unwilling recipient
seeks an injunction, requesting that the court protect his or her right not
to hear or see a particular message. The right to choose would not be
protected by an ordinance like that sustained in Frisby; there the govern-
ment decided for its citizens what speech they should want to hear.123
The right to repose might be posed separately or in conjunction with
the right to choose. For example, in Rowan, both values are impli-
cated;-124 in Frisby, only the former."2 5 As indicated earlier, the court
should not merely assume that any speech that "touches" the home in-
fringes on the right to repose in objectionable ways; unwilling listeners
should more specifically detail how their rights to peace and tranquility
in the home (or elsewhere) are jeopardized. Evidence could be intro-
duced that the noise from the picketing was so intrusive that people
could not communicate, peacefully read, or even think thoughts. Or,
evidence might show that the family was forced to leave the house be-
cause the picketing was so intrusive. In some cases, there might not be
any evidence that the speech interferes with repose.
Finally, the court could consider whether, and to what extent, the
unwilling listener is harmed psychologically by the speech. Claims of
mere offensiveness should not be enough to outweigh free speech con-
cerns; if the offensive speech is likely to cause serious emotional distress,
the balance of interests may tilt against the right to freedom of
expression.
B. How Much of a Burden?
The second factor the courts should evaluate explicitly is the burden
on the listener in avoiding the speech. Initially, the court should con-
sider the range of avoidance techniques, and analyze which one(s) effec-
tively insulate the unwilling listener from the message. Next, the court
should assess whether these ways of avoiding the message impinge on
the very values protected under the captive audience doctrine: choice,
repose, and avoiding emotional distress. For example, people almost al-
ways can put their hands over their ears to escape a verbal message deliv-
ered into the home. But this will infringe too greatly on repose: keeping
122. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 730 (1970).
123. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 476-77 (1988).
124. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 732.
125. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484.
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one's hands over one's ears eliminates any ability to do many things that
the peacefulness and tranquility of the home are supposed to permit.
Earplugs may be a more viable option, but they too infringe on the ability
to communicate with others within the home and thus develop or pre-
serve intimate relations. These options, moreover, may infringe on
choice: by closing off one's ears, one cannot listen to those sounds one
wishes to hear.
Similarly, even turning one's head from speech, while protecting
choice and perhaps repose, may not preserve the right to be free from
emotional distress. It is only with emotional distress, not with some un-
defined notion of assault, that the court might find that any exposure to
the speech is too great a burden for the unwilling listener. The court,
moreover, must be careful not to use its own view of offensiveness or the
government's assumption of what is offensive speech. There should be
specific and persuasive evidence that any exposure to the speech is likely
to cause, or did cause, significant emotional distress before the burden on
the listener to avoid the speech is possibly obviated.
Moreover, as discussed earlier, the burden may be unacceptable be-
cause it does not represent a real choice to the listener. For example,
deciding not to apply for welfare because of offensive messages in the
government office is not a viable option for an impoverished individual.
Forfeiting one's place in line at the airport terminal to turn away from a
message is not an onerous physical burden, but the consequences of such
an action make it an unrealistic choice. Crossing the street, however, to
avoid listening to a religious sermon, or closing your eyes on the bus (or
reading a book) to avoid looking at offensive advertisements, typically
should not be considered unreasonable or onerous.
C. What Is the Impact on Expression?
The third factor the court should weigh is the impact on the First
Amendment right to freedom of expression if the speech were prohibited
or regulated. Here, the court needs to examine several specific questions.
First, what is the effect of the proposed regulation on willing listeners?
The captive audience doctrine may curtail the autonomy interests of
others who desire to see or hear the message. When the government
prohibits the posting of political ads in buses, it infringes the rights of
other persons who would choose to receive such speech. As indicated
earlier, courts on numerous occasions have protected the right not to
hear at the expense of other willing listeners.126 In so doing, courts in-
126. See, e.g., supra notes 31-33, 35, and 51 and accompanying text.
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fringe the very interest they seek to preserve through the captive audi-
ence doctrine. The Seventh Circuit recognized this problem when
rejecting the constitutionality of the Brookfield ordinance in Schultz v.
Frisby:12
7
It is also unclear how one is to separate conceptually, or actually,
willing from unwilling listeners. One person's heresy is another's
orthodoxy; the tamest discourse may be heard as a thunderous phi-
lippic. Maybe all of Dr. Victoria's neighbors disapproved of the
plaintiff's picketing, but maybe somewhere in the community the
picketer's chants fell on sympathetic ears. What seems relatively
clear is that a municipality may not decide for its citizens what
messages they may receive. Privacy, by definition, is a right that
adheres to the person, and not to the community. The Town of
Brookfield has usurped its citizens' right to decide for themselves
what they shall, or shall not, hear and see.128
Thus, the court will need to determine whether employing the cap-
tive audience doctrine infringes other listeners' rights to choose what
speech to hear or see. To some extent, this issue turns on the existence of
alternative, comparative forms of communication. The court should
carefully tailor its order, if possible, to protect both the willing and un-
willing listener. For example, an injunction prohibiting protests-proven
to be sufficiently disturbing to the homeowner-within 10 yards of the
target's home, yet permitting such picketing elsewhere in the neighbor-
hood, may withstand constitutional challenge. This alternative forum
may be comparable to picketing in front of the house, because the picket-
ers can still reach the target as well as other potential listeners, without
infringing too greatly on the right of the target to be free from unwanted
messages in his or her home. As discussed, the Court's analysis in
Pacifica is inadequate on this issue; it fails to consider the noncom-
parability of the other avenues for speech in exposing people to the
message. 129
Finally, the court will need to consider other interests infringed by
restricting freedom of speech. For example, there is a societal interest,
and perhaps an individual interest, in exposing people to different ideas.
The theory behind the First Amendment assumes that society benefits in
a marketplace of ideas, in which arguments are met with counter-argu-
ments, and there is a free flow of ideas, including the unorthodox and the
unpopular. 130 If we all rejected ideas that ran counter to our intuition
127. 807 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1986).
128. Id at 1352.
129. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 726 (1978).
130. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Den-
nis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 546-53 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Whitney v.
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without any exposure to them, our growth as individuals would suffer.
Thus, the court would need to assess the overall impact on the speaker's
ability to communicate the message to society-that is, to convey the
thought in the marketplace of ideas.
D. The Balance
In evaluating and weighing these three factors, the greatest justifica-
tion for regulation of expression based on the captive audience doctrine
exists when the speech is highly intrusive upon the values discussed in
Part III, where the burden in avoiding speech would be very great, and
the effect on expression quite minimal. Under this test, Pacifica was de-
cided incorrectly. George Carlin's monologue played by the radio sta-
tion does not violate repose in any meaningful way, especially if a person
tuned in at the beginning of the broadcast, and individuals could protect
themselves (and thus achieve the autonomy values) by turning off the
radio or changing channels. The offensiveness of the speech does not rise
to the level of emotional distress. The impact on First Amendment
rights, however, is great because many willing listeners are completely
denied access to speech. Moreover, no alternative forum would substi-
tute for the radio.
On the other hand, racist speech in a dormitory might be an exam-
ple where the captive audience doctrine is appropriately applied to re-
strict speech. Consider again the hypothetical of a racist poster placed
on a dormitory door near the room of an African-American student. All
three values underlying the right to be let alone are potentially implicated
here. The African-American student's right to be free from offense may
be infringed. The student may demonstrate that her right to repose in
the home is infringed by evidence that she felt compelled to leave the
dormitory or no longer felt capable of using her dorm room for what it
was intended. Whether her right to choose what speech to see or hear
was violated would turn on the possible alternative ways to avoid the
message. Although the individual could turn her head, that may not
protect her from emotional distress. While moving from the dormitory
may accomplish that result, 3 ' the doctrine should not require such ex-
traordinary efforts: that would by itself infringe on the right to repose
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-78 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See also Lawrence Byard
Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First Amendment Freedom of
Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 54 (1989).
131. This may not be true; the mere exposure may seem too great a burden to place on the
student.
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and should not be considered a free choice.1 32 Less extreme alternatives,
like taking a different route out of the dorm, also might be addressed.
The court would need to assess what the student gives up if required to
exercise this option: is the student forced to take a less desirable route
(i.e., the stairs instead of the elevator)? Would the student be compelled
to forego certain opportunities that other students have, such as being
able to visit the dorm rooms of certain other students near the poster?
Finally, the court would need to consider the First Amendment rights of
those who live in the dorm and wish to express themselves in such a way,
and the First Amendment interests of willing viewers who might be de-
nied access to this message.
Conclusion
The captive audience doctrine is an undercurrent in First Amend-
ment jurisprudence. Rarely subjected to careful analysis, it surfaces from
time to time as the basis for restricting speech. The doctrine advances
important values, and it should not be discarded. But these values cur-
rently are served only imprecisely and indirectly because application of
the captive audience doctrine does not focus on them. Nor does analysis
under a captive audience doctrine adequately consider the effects of the
doctrine on free speech.
If the captive audience doctrine is to remain-and I believe it
should--courts using it must engage in explicit and detailed analysis of
the specific interests involved. The captive audience doctrine should be-
come a method of analysis, not just a catchy slogan. The solution I pro-
pose does not provide a simple formula or a determinate single rule. But
by identifying the specific factors that should be considered in the appli-
cation of the captive audience doctrine, the doctrine should prove more
workable. This analysis should allow the courts to protect more consist-
ently and effectively the rights of both the speaker and all listeners, will-
ing and unwilling. Thus can the substance replace the slogan.
132. See Lawrence, supra note 9, at 456 ("Minority students should not be required to
remain in their rooms to avoid racial assault. Minimally, they should find a safe haven in their
dorms and other common rooms that are a part of their daily routine.").
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